























A thesis submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for 















© 2015 Nicholas D. Kron 
All Rights Reserved 




Globalization, the Information Age, and the fall of the Soviet Union has changed the 
political landscape of the world. In order to prosper, governments increasingly must work 
with other nation-states on diplomatic issues ranging from the economy to defense to 
trans-national criminal activity. In this thesis, I examine whether the United States (U.S.) 
can use a tailored approach to security diplomacy, which acknowledges historic 
grievances in order to solidify or increase its influence with nations vis-à-vis historic 
rivals.    
 
For this thesis, I concentrate on the security aspect of diplomacy, and although there is a 
plethora of literature on defense diplomacy, I’m approaching the topic from a new angle, 
which argues that the defense diplomacy of the Cold War era is not sufficient for modern 
day diplomacy. The United States must reshape defense diplomacy into an all-
encompassing effort known as security diplomacy. Security diplomacy is comprised of 
defense, rule-of-law, human rights, and humanitarian crisis response initiatives that are 
packaged to meet the specific needs of its partners. 
  
Using a qualitative approach, I examine the various aspects of security diplomacy utilized 
by the United States, and its rivals, to determine its effectiveness in gaining political 
capital/influence with Allies and partners. Chapter 1 – Latin America and Chapter 2 – 
Africa, seeks to determine whether the United States can effectively use security 
diplomacy in regions that experienced colonization as well as government intervention 
through the use of military force, within the past 100 years.  For Chapter 3, I shift my 
	   ii	  
attention to Eastern Europe, and seek to answer the same question with the difference 
being the Cold War rivalries, rather than colonization or military intervention being in the 
psyche of Allies and partners.  
 
In Chapter 1 and 2, I examined the United States and its rival’s use of security diplomacy 
with Latin America and Sub – Saharan Africa. Despite a history of military and political 
interventionism, the United States has been successful in improving its influence 
throughout these two regions thru security diplomacy; however, mistrust of the United 
States has led some countries, such as Venezuela, to seek alternative security partnerships 
with countries such as Russia, China, and Iran.  
 
Chapter 3 examined the U.S. use of security diplomacy with former Warsaw Pact 
members. This chapter is especially relevant today, as Russia has re-emerged as a 
regional challenger to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United 
States. In this chapter, I identified ways and means for the United States to improve its 
political influence regionally through bi-lateral security cooperation.  
 
In conclusion, I argue the United States can strengthen its influence using a tailored 
approach to security diplomacy that addresses its partner’s security requirements, while 
keeping in mind past grievances.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States found itself in the unique 
position of being a hegemon in an international system that was quickly becoming 
unstable in comparison to the bipolar environment of the Cold War. While state on state 
violence still occurred, as seen between Serbia and Bosnia – Herzegovina, more 
asymmetric threats began to emerge from the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Very few 
regions were spared by these threats as they sought to delegitimize governments, and 
challenge the status quo. This instability often resulted in violence as a means to 
influence the internal and external politics of governments. 
 
With such a fluid and dynamic political environment, the United States had to adapt to 
the new political realities it was facing. Internationally, it had to satisfy its current treaty 
obligations, such as NATO, while engaging non-traditional partner nation-states. In order 
to achieve its policy objectives, the United States often offers diplomatic assistance in the 
form of economic, social, and security aid. The way the U.S. uses these diplomatic tools 
can be observed today as it confronts threats from the Latin American drug cartels, 
international terrorism, and the re-emergence of an aggressive Russia.   
 
This thesis acknowledges that defense diplomacy is not a new concept, and has been used 
in various capacities since the Napoleonic Era; however, it does propose a new definition 
that combines multiple aspects of security into one term, which I argue better reflects the 
United States current approach to defense related security. It merges the capabilities 
derived from Title 10 (Defense), Title 18 (Law Enforcement), Title 32 (National Guard), 
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and Title 50 (National Security) authorities in support of Title 22 (Foreign Relations) 
initiatives under a single term known as security diplomacy. When used properly, 
security diplomacy brings to bare the entirety of a nation-states security prowess to 
support a partner’s security organizations. This can include but is not limited to military 
exchanges, military sales, joint exercises, rule-of-law training, human rights training, and 
humanitarian disasters response training.  
 
By accepting this term, U.S. policymakers and government agencies have an approved 
definition that provides them with a single diplomatic approach to security assistance, 
which simplifies framing the aid package. Also, it describes current interagency efforts, 
led by the Department of State, taking place in locations such as Afghanistan, Columbia, 
and Kenya. Finally, it can help simplify the planning process by giving planners a 
definition and/or idea to build policy as well as strategies around.  
 
Whether the Department of State recognizes the term, it must be cognizant of U.S. 
security institutions strengths, weaknesses, and how they best compliment one another in 
order to provide the most efficient security package to its partners. Failing to execute this 
properly can lead to U.S. foreign policy objectives not being met, but for some partners it 
can be detrimental to their government and/or citizens. Finally, by having a synchronized 
approach to security, the United States can more effectively manage its security 
diplomacy overseas, and help shape the world’s perception of the U.S. 
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Methodology  
As mentioned in the abstract, I approach this thesis using a qualitative model, which 
examines the effectiveness of U.S. security diplomacy as a means to achieve its national 
interest. Geographically I look at Latin America, Sub – Saharan Africa, and Eastern 
Europe. I selected these regions for their historical value with the United States security 
apparatus, most especially its military.  
 
Chapter 1 begins by looking at the various forms of diplomacy, and distinguish the 
differences between coercive and security diplomacy. Following this, I discuss the 
history between Latin American and the United States, and how it still influences 
perceptions today. Most importantly I look at examine the effectiveness of the United 
States as well as its rival’s use of security diplomacy in the region.  What I discovered 
was that despite a history of military and political interventionism, the United States has 
been successful building political relationships through security diplomacy; however, 
mistrust of the United States has led some countries to seek alternative partners. An 
example of this is Venezuela seeking to build partnerships with China, Russia, and Iran. 
Although it was not the United States, this case study still illustrates the value of security 
diplomacy in building relationships with existing or potential partner nations.   
 
The first sections in Chapter 2 look at security diplomacy as it relates to international 
theory, and similar to Chapter 2, it demonstrates how history has shaped the perceptions 
of our African partners. This was especially seen in the initial discussions of the creation 
of U.S. African Command. Then I examine the use of security diplomacy by the United 
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States as well as China in Sub – Saharan Africa, and identify the key differences in their 
approach to security diplomacy. Unlike Latin America, geographical distance and having 
never colonized an African nation has made the process of building solid security 
relationships easier for the United States; furthermore, the tailored approach to security 
diplomacy has proven to be successful in improving political relations with our partners. 
 
Like Chapters 1 and 2, Chapter 3 looks at history, and how it has shaped current politics 
with the United States. Using this information, I examine the U.S.’s ability to use security 
diplomacy as a means to improve its standing with former Cold War rivals. Unlike 
Chapter’s 1 and 2, these countries never experienced, in recent history, colonization by 
Western powers, but have been shaped by fear of Russian interventionist policies. In this 
Chapter, I demonstrate how the U.S. can use this fear to improve its regional standing 
through security diplomacy by looking at its bi-lateral relationship with Poland and 
Georgia.  
 
Contribution to Literature  
Having witnessed first hand the benefits of synchronizing Title 10, 18, 32, and 22 
initiatives into one plan in Iraq and Afghanistan, I hope to contribute a new diplomatic 
approach that combines all elements of security into a single well defined planning 
approach. While defense diplomacy is still relevant today, I believe it falls short of truly 
capturing the totality of our partner’s security limitations. More and more of our partners 
require assistance beyond the standard DoD defense initiatives. They need improvements 
in their military, national police, local police, and other security institutions. The 
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spectrum of assistance ranges from military force on force training to basic human rights 
training of the local police on dealing with their citizens, especially for partners dealing 
with an active insurgency, think Columbia or Ukraine.  
 
By clearly defining security diplomacy, planners can begin breaking down stovepipes 
that exist between agencies, and start approaching their strategic and operational plans 
from an interagency perspective. If this starts at the very beginning of the planning 
process, rather than an after thought, interagency planners can produce synchronized 
plans that can be utilized by the Department of State as negotiation tools. Lastly, this is 
not to say that defense diplomacy will not be utilized, but quite the opposite. It will likely 


























“Every nation, great or small, whether part of the central strategic balance or not, is 
fundamentally concerned with its ability to defend the integrity of its territory and 
maintain internal order. It is of substantial political importance to the United States that 
we be able to respond to the felt needs of nations with which we seek constructive 
relations across the broad range of contemporary issues. The United States cannot expect 
to retain influence with nations whose perceived defense needs we disregard. Thus, a 
careful security assistance policy is a crucial instrument of our national policy in much 
the same sense as are our political support and economic assistance. 
       -Henry A. Kissinger, in a statement 
before   the House Committee on International Relations,  
6 November 1975”1  
 
Research Question 
Can the United States use security diplomacy to increase its influence in Latin America 
(LATAM) while overcoming historical perceptions of U.S. imperialism?  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1970’s Latin America has experienced an evolution in politics as governments 
transitioned from military dictatorships or autocracies to democracies. This process has 
been very challenging for many Latin American countries as leadership within the 
democratic governments seek to exert control and influence over a military that once 
controlled the political process.2  However, this provides a unique opportunity for the 
United States to promote democratic values and processes within these governments 
through defense, economic, and public diplomacy. While I believe the most successful 
outcome will be derived from a combination of all three diplomatic tools, this section will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Sereseres, Caesar D. "Inter-American Security Relations: The Future of US Military Diplomacy in the 
Hemisphere." Parameters 7, no. 3 (1975). 
2 Cottey, Andrew. Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance. 
Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2013. http://JHU.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=1397351 (accessed 
April 11, 2014) 
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concentrate on the defense aspect of diplomacy. Although the United States reputation in 
Latin America isn’t ideal, due to historical meddling, I propose that opportunities exist to 
strengthen and build mutually beneficial relationships through security diplomacy. 
    
TYPES OF DIPLOMACY 
As civilizations evolved from the nomadic tribes of the past to modern societies, so have 
their techniques of interacting with one another to achieve their individual or collective 
goals.  In today’s geo-political environment an international actor could be a nation-state, 
Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), international corporation, or terrorist 
organization seeking to influence the international community through various means of 
economic, public, and security diplomacy.3 
 
Before examining the use of security diplomacy as a mechanism to increase the United 
States influence in Latin America, I believe it’s important to highlight other forms of 
diplomacy that can be used separately or in tandem with security diplomacy to achieve 




Traditional diplomacy is the form of diplomacy that comes to mind by the average 
person, and is an attempt by an international actor to influence the international 
environment through engagement with other international actors.4   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Cull, Nicholas J. "Public diplomacy: Lessons from the past." CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy 
(2009): 12. 
4 Ibid, pg. 12 
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Economic Diplomacy 
Economic diplomacy is harnessing the international environment to advance an 
international actors foreign policy, and employing economic tools such as trade 
agreements and fiscal agreements to secure its economic strength.5  
 
Public Diplomacy 
Public diplomacy is similar to traditional diplomacy with the exception of seeking to 
influence another international actor’s population through informational and cultural 
programs.6  
 
Defense Diplomacy  
Defense diplomacy has occurred since the seventeenth century when countries sent their 
military officers abroad to collect intelligence, monitor, and serve as a liaison to their 
allies.  This form of defense diplomacy continued relatively unchanged until the 
twentieth century. In 1961, during the Vienna Convention, Military Attaché Officers 
were granted the same rights and status as other diplomats, and less than 30 years later, 
following the fall of the Iron Curtain, their roles would drastically shift from collect and 
monitor to having more of a diplomatic flavor.7 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 “Economic Statecraft,” U.S. Department of State, Accessed on April 5, 2014, 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/econstatecraft/ 
6 Swistek, Göran. 2012. "The Nexus Between Public Diplomacy and Military Diplomacy in Foreign Affairs 
and Defense Policy." Connections (18121098) 11, no. 2: 79-86. International Security & Counter 
Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost (accessed April 5, 2014). 
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Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world found itself in an unfamiliar 
security environment with former enemies now allies, and former allies now enemies. A 
great example of this is Poland and the Czech Republic, former Warsaw Pact members, 
joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and former allies, the mujahedeen in 
Afghanistan, sheltering Al Qaeda.  In response to the changing international environment, 
defense diplomacy evolved and expanded beyond the Defense Attaché, and into the 
business of Department of Defense (DOD) representatives seeking to influence nations, 
nations’ militaries, and nation’s citizens in order to achieve a strategic end-state.8 The 
Defense Attaché’s responsibilities transformed into those similar to traditional diplomats 
with a military essence. These new responsibilities included but were not limited to 
assisting with defense reform of the former Warsaw Pact members; civil – military peace 
operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Somalia; and participating in the Global War on 
Terror.9 
 
Before moving forward it’s important to distinguish between defense and coercive 
diplomacy.  Defense diplomacy seeks to build partnerships through the use of defense 
related programs, and does not seek to intimidate its partners into cooperation. 




8 Willard, James E. Military Diplomacy: An Essential Tool for Foreign Policy at the Theater Strategic 
Level. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF 
ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES, 2006. 
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Oppositely, coercive diplomacy attempts to change the behavior of an international 
actor(s) through the threat of force, or the use of limited military action. Unlike defense 
diplomacy that seeks to build partnerships between international actors through security 
cooperation, coercive diplomacy seeks to utilize its military superiority to shape the 
environment through fear of conflict.10  Coercive diplomacy is often referred to as 
gunboat diplomacy.11 A recent example of coercive diplomacy is the 2014 invasion of 
Ukraine, by the Russian military, following the ouster of President Yanukovich who 
sought closer ties with Russia vice Western Europe. This invasion resulted in the 
annexation of the Crimean Peninsula through brute force, and is clearly not the use of 
defense diplomacy for a peaceful purpose.   
 
Security Diplomacy 
As discussed in the introduction, security diplomacy goes beyond defense diplomacy, and 
harnesses a country’s security institutions into one combined effort in support of their 
diplomatic enterprises. This is not meant to replace defense diplomacy, but to be an 
option for policymakers.   
  
In my opinion, these various forms of diplomacy work best when used in combination 
with one another; however, if properly tailored to fulfill the needs of partner nation then 
they can effectively achieve a government’s end-state alone.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 DIPLOMACY." Revista Academiei Fortelor Terestre 19, no. 1: 10-16. Academic Search Complete, 
EBSCOhost (accessed April 5, 2014). 
11 “Gunboat.” Dictionary.com. Accessed April 10, 2014. 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/gunboat+diplomacy?s=t  
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LITERARY REVIEW 
The readings on the United States using security diplomacy throughout Latin America 
has been mixed. Some of the readings view security diplomacy as a way the U.S. can 
improve its image throughout the region, and regain influence it lost due to the Global 
War on Terrorism. Other articles claim perceptions of the U.S. are at an all time low, and 
the U.S. government must be cautious in its use of the military in the region, due to past 
perceptions of interventionist policies.  
 
Mr. Shapiro, in A New Era for U.S. Security Assistance, feels that the United States can 
improve its image through security diplomacy. He argues than anytime in history, 
countries are seeking to partner with the United States. He claims as the U.S. begins to 
drawdown from its current global posture, it can refocus on building lasting partnerships, 
and security diplomacy will be one of key tools used by the Department of State.12 
 
Mr. Shapiro contends the United States can gain influence through the use of security 
diplomacy by assisting our allies and partners through Foreign Military Sales and Foreign 
Military Finances, which would enable them to operationally partner with the United 
States. By operating from the same weapons platforms, the United States and it’s allies 
and partners would have the ability to coordinate on the battlefield as the defense systems 
would have the ability to communicate. Also, the United States would have to train its 
partners on the systems, thus creating more occasions to strengthen relationships.  
Professional Military Education is another tool Mr. Shapiro sees as an opportunity to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Shapiro, Andrew J. 2012. “A New Era for U.S. Security Assistance.” The Washington Quarterly 35:4: 
23-35. (Accessed February 26, 2014). DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2012.725021 
	   12	  
further ties between the United States and it’s allies. By exchanging military officers with 
partner nations, they can improve their language ability, gain an appreciation for other 
cultures, and develop professional relationships with one another that can be used as the 
officers advance in rank and responsibility.13 While Mr. Shapiro concentrates on tools 
used in defense diplomacy, the same exchanges can occur between law enforcement 
agencies as well as National Guard units. Please refer to Table 1, below, for further 
















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ibid 26-29 
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Table 1: US Military Cooperation and Assistance Programs 
The Foreign Military Sales (FMS): A program that provides security assistance 
authorized by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and a fundamental tool of U.S. 
foreign policy.  The Secretary of State determines which countries will have access 
to this program, and the Secretary of Defense executes the program.14 
The Arms Export Control Act (AECA): This act authorizes the President to finance 
procurement of defense articles and services for foreign countries and international 
organizations. The Secretary of State determines which countries will have access 
to this program, and the Secretary of Defense executes the program.15 
International Military Education and Training (IMET): Provides training to foreign 
military and civilian personnel at U.S. military training and education institutions. 
Can also provide this training in other countries.16 
Excess Defense Articles (EDA): Transfers excess defense equipment to foreign 
governments or international organizations for the purpose of modernizing their 
forces in order to better partner with the United States. This equipment is provided 
at a reduced price or as a grant. The Military Departments identify excess 
equipment and the Combatant Commands identify possible recipients.17 
Building Partnership Capacity (BPC): Section 1206 Train and Equip under the BPC 
program builds partnership capacity for counterterrorism operations and/or in 
support of stability operations that involve the United States military. The Special 




Opposing Mr. Shapiro’s argument is former Ambassador Myles Frechette who claims 
that the United States should not use defense diplomacy, and aspect of security 
diplomacy, in Latin American affairs. In Rethinking Latin America: A New Approach in 
U.S. Foreign Policy, he argues that the United States should not interfere in Latin 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 “Foreign Military Sales (FMS).” Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Accessed 11 April 2014. 
http://www.dsca.mil/programs/fms  
15 “Foreign Military Financing (FMF).” Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Accessed 11 April 2014. 
http://www.dsca.mil/programs/fmf  
16 Cottey, Andrew. Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance. 
Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2013. http://JHU.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=1397351 (accessed 
April 11, 2014) 
17 “Excess Defense Articles (EDA).” Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Accessed 11 April 2014. 
http://www.dsca.mil/programs/eda  
18 “Building Partnership Capacity (BPC).” Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Accessed 11 April 2014. 
http://www.dsca.mil/programs/section-1206-train-and-equip  
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America. He asserts the United States is still taking a Cold War approach to defense 
diplomacy, and instead they should be assisting LATAM with modernizing itself. Rather 
than having them spend money on weapons systems that they do not need, the United 
States should encourage them to use the funds for reducing poverty, improving education, 
and combating criminality.  
 
Furthermore, he believes the United States should reduce its military presence in the 
region, and encourage the governments to confront international terrorism and 21st 
century problems on their own. By taking this hands off approach, he feels the United 
States will assist LATAM in standing on its own, and at the same time improve its 
trustworthiness throughout LATAM.19 
 
It is important to note that U.S. is not the only country conducting defense diplomacy in 
LATAM; rather historic rivals often use defense diplomacy as an incentive to accomplish 
their political and economic objectives in Latin America.  The readings were almost 
unanimous in agreeing that countries such as the Russian Federation, the Peoples 
Republic of China (PRC), and Iran are openly welcomed by leftist countries desiring an 
alternative to the United States; furthermore, other countries with neutral to good 
relations with the U.S. have been receptive to these countries defense related overtures.20 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Frechette, Myles. 2006. "Rethinking Latin America." Harvard International Review 28, no. 2: 28-31. 
Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed May 4, 2014). 
20 Sanchez, W. Alejandro. 2010. "Russia and Latin America at the dawn of the twenty-first century." 
Journal Of Transatlantic Studies (Routledge) 8, no. 4: 362-384. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost 
(accessed March 20, 2014). 
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Recognizing that the majority of literature focused on defense diplomacy, I believe this 
further illustrates my belief in using a model based on security diplomacy. In doing so, 
the U.S. could have greater flexibility that derives from separate authorities. This can be 
used to gain an advantage over rivals as well as influence local perceptions of its 
operations within their region. For example, rather than conducting joint military 
exercises that usually draw the attention of the media, due to the large footprint, the U.S. 
could do an exchange with national and local law enforcement agents. By doing this, the 
U.S. could still deepen its relationship, achieve similar outcomes, and limit its military 
presence to prevent political fallout from anti-U.S. population segments. 
 
HISTORY OF U.S. – LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 
In order to fully understand the debate for the use of security diplomacy by the United 
States in LATAM, it is important for the readers to have an understanding of U.S. foreign 
policy towards the region, and how modern day perceptions, real or perceived, effect it. 
 
Pre – Cold War Relations: The major U.S. policies that shaped the pre – Cold War era 
were the Monroe Doctrine, the Roosevelt Corollary, and the Good Neighbor Policy. The 
Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary were seen as interventionist policies, 
primarily the latter, that sought to impose U.S. policies upon the Western Hemisphere, 
even if it meant using the military. Two examples of these policies were the support of 
the Panamanian revolution in order to achieve our own interests in the Panama Canal, 
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and the invasion of Haiti.21 22 23  Both the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary are 
good examples of coercive diplomacy.  
 
The Good Neighbor Policy along with the Neutrality was a time period when the United 
States sought to pull back from its interventionist policies in LATAM, and instead focus 
on bringing the United States out of the Great Depression.24 However, following the 
United States entering World War II, its previous isolationist policies would no longer 
suffice, and it would be forced to the world stage.  
 
Cold War Relations: This era witnessed a complete reversal of President Roosevelt’s 
Good Neighbor Policy, as the United States battled Marxist and left-wing ideology 
throughout the region in order to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining beachheads.25 
This geo-political tug of war could be observed from the 1940’s to the 1980s as the 
United States supported any government that opposed the Soviet Union. This included 
supporting military coups in countries like Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Guatemala, 
Peru, and Venezuela as well as the Contras in Central America during the 1970’s and 
80s.26 27   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 “Milestones: 1801 – 1829,” Department of States, Office of the Historian, Accessed April 5, 2014, 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/monroe  
22 “Milestones: 1899 – 1913,” Department of States, Office of the Historian, Accessed April 5, 2014, 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/roosevelt-and-monroe-doctrine  
23 “Milestones: 1914 – 1920,” Department of States, Office of the Historian, Accessed April 5, 2014, 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/haiti  
24 “Milestones: 1937 – 1945,” Department of States, Office of the Historian, Accessed April 11, 2014, 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/american-isolationism  
25 Ibid, pg. 121-123 
26 Arnold, James R.; Wiener, Roberta. Cold War. Santa Barbara : ABC-CLIO, 2012. 
http://JHU.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=871436 (accessed April 11, 2014) 
27 Ibid, pg 123 
	   17	  
Post – Cold War Relations:  Following the Cold War, the United States and LATAM 
relations as a whole have grown from an economic, political, and security perspective. 
Currently 11 free trade agreements exist with 11 countries making the United States one 
of the major trading partners in the region as well as the largest source of foreign 
investment for many countries. Latin American nations supply the United States with 
almost one – third of its imported crude oil, and provide the largest source of legal and 
illegal immigration. Furthermore, since the 1980s the United States has actively been 
working with LATAM countries to combat trans-national organized crime syndicates 
operating in the drug trade. Recently there has been an increase in security cooperation 
with Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. In addition to combating the cartels, 
the United States has provided both humanitarian and security support in response to 
natural disasters, as seen in Haiti.28   
 
HYPOTHESIS 
My hypothesis is the United States can increase its credibility and influence throughout 
Latin America through the use of security diplomacy.  Although historical grievances 
exist, security diplomacy can create conditions that foster cooperation between nation-
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UNITED STATES USE OF SECURITY DIPLOMACY 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has been an important shift in the nature and 
purposes of international security cooperation that goes beyond the realpolitik defense 
diplomacy of yesterday. While still acknowledging its realpolitik role of supporting the 
armed forces and security of allies, it also is being used to achieve greater foreign and 
security policy objectives by seeking to breakdown barriers with previous rivals through 
security cooperation and assistance.29 
 
This approach to security diplomacy can be seen in the United States relationship with 
previous Warsaw Pact members such as Poland, Czech Republic and the Ukraine. 
Security related programs and initiatives that were once only for long standing allies have 
been opened up to previous enemies in order to build trust and confidence between the 
nations (Refer to Table 1 for Defense Diplomacy Programs). Through these programs the 
United States strengthens existing relationship with partners like Colombia and Korea, 
while simultaneously building relationships with Cold War rivals that are based on 
trust.30 
  
U.S. USE OF SECURITY DIPLOMACY IN LATIN AMERICA 
In the past security diplomacy with Latin America has been problematic, due to the 
United States interventionist policies, and the LATAM armed forces historically playing 
a central role in politics ranging from coups to military backed regimes. However, 
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following the end of the Cold War, democratic ideas began to flourish throughout 
LATAM, and all the nations in LATAM transitioned from military or authoritarian rule, 
with the exception of Cuba, to democratically elected governments. In response to this 
political change, the United States began to work closer with LATAM partners on 
security cooperation, rule of law, and respect for human rights.31  
 
Beginning in the nineties, following this reinvigorated diplomatic initiative, the United 
States created three strategic security objectives towards LATAM that is reflected in our 
security diplomacy. The first was the 1995 Security Strategy for the Americas, which 
declared the U.S. would support democratic norms throughout the region, including 
civilian control of the defense establishment, constructive civil – military relations, and 
respect for human rights. The final two were the U.S. led War on Drugs and War on 
Terror.32  
 
With respect to the three U.S. strategic security objectives, I will now present two case 
studies discussing how security diplomacy has been used effectively in building long-
term partnerships that achieve both the U.S. and its partner’s political objectives.  
 
Columbia Case Study (1995 - 2014) 
Columbia has been a key regional ally to the United States that has been fighting an 
armed insurgency for half a century as well as organized criminal drug syndicates. Over 
the past couple decades the United States and Colombia have developed a strong working 
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relationship through security cooperation under the guise of security diplomacy; 
furthermore, this directly resulted in the two countries expanding their relationship 
beyond security, to social and economic cooperation.33   
 
To assist in furthering security diplomacy, in 2000 the United States Congress approved 
an $860 million aid package known as Plan Colombia that was designed to reduce the 
cultivation and production of drugs. In addition to funds going to fight the War on Drugs, 
26% of the funding went to judicial reform, human rights, and democratic strengthening.  
Two years later an additional $400 million went to a wider strategy known as the Andean 
Regional Initiative, which broadened the U.S. defense diplomacy ability to work beyond 
counter-narcotics to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.34  
 
As of 2013, the United States government, specifically the 113th Congress, had taken 
great interest in the oversight of Colombia’s successes against the FARC, narco-
terrorists, and in its progress toward democratic values such as human rights and rule of 
law. Congress continues to monitor Colombia’s progress, and is using economic 
diplomacy in combination with security diplomacy to solidify the partnership and assist 
in achieving both countries security concerns.35  
The Andean Initiative is a great case of security diplomacy successfully tackling a 
common security concerns, and helping the United States improve its diplomatic standing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Sullivan, Mark P. 2013. Latin America and the Caribbean: Key issues for the 113th congress. 
Congressional Research Service: Report (08/09): 1-33.  
34 “Country Studies: Columbia.” The Library of Congress Researchers. Accessed April 10, 2014.  
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/list.html  
35 Sullivan, Mark P. 2013. Latin America and the Caribbean: Key issues for the 113th congress. 
Congressional Research Service: Report (08/09): 1-33. 
	   21	  
with a Latin American country. This initiative truly maximized the United States’ 
security diplomacy by allowing U.S. forces to train, advice, and assist the Colombian 
military in counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations against non-state actors that 
conducted both criminal and terrorist activities.36 Through intensive training by U.S. 
Special Operations Forces, the Colombian military became a more professional 
organization that possessed the capability and capacity to challenge both insurgents and 
narco-terrorists; in addition, they were taught how to train others in the same techniques 
(train the trainer instruction) giving them the ability to assist the United States in 
professionalizing other LATAM militaries. These efforts resulted in cocaine production 
decreasing by 72 percent since 2001, overall violence in the country falling, and the 
FARC seeking negotiations with the Columbian government.37   
 
While not perfect, the United States use of security diplomacy has been very successful 
in Colombia. By approaching the relationship as a partnership with the Colombian 
government, the U.S. improved the Colombian government’s perception of it, and gained 
credibility as a good partner. This along with other combined diplomatic approaches can 
assist in improving the U.S.’s reputation regionally, as they seek to achieve mutual goals.   
 
 
Mexico Case Study (2004 – 2014) 
Despite the United States fighting a war with Mexico less than 150 years ago, which 
resulted in the annexation of large swaths of land, the two countries have been able to 
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breakdown barriers on the military, economic and social fronts. In fact, through multiple 
avenues of diplomacy, the two countries are now security and economic partners, along 
with Canada, in the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America as well as the 
North American Free Trade Agreement.38  
 
Security diplomacy being an enabler to the Security and Prosperity of North America 
agreement, has taken on the form of assisting the Mexican military, through the Merida 
Initiative, in their war against trans-national organized crime. Unlike Plan Colombia, the 
United States military did not deploy troops into Mexico to conduct joint operations with 
the Mexican military, due to national sovereignty issues from the two countries past, but 
instead it uses tools from security diplomacy to assist the Mexican government.  
 
This assistance included but is not limited to foreign military financing ($7 million for 
FY13), military training, and providing unmanned aerial vehicles at the request of the 
Mexican government to gather intelligence on threats. Other security diplomacy efforts 
include training 3,000 Mexican military personnel on issues related to intelligence, 
sustainability, and professional development.39  
 
To display how the Merida Initiative impacted communities in Mexico, I will discuss the 
Juarez initiative. Beginning in 2010, the United States, expanded the Merida Initiative 
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beyond the scope of only equipping and training Mexican security forces to include three 
more lines of effort. The first line of effort focused on strengthening human rights and 
rule-of-law training; the second modernizing the border; and the third was building 
resilient communities within Mexico. From this expansion, three communities were 
selected within Juarez, out of nine total communities, and they received approximately 
$15 million over three years to support crime prevention and community policing 
platforms. In addition, an additional $10 million in grants went to local civil society 
groups targeting youths at risk.40 
 
Graph 1: 2005 – 2013 Homicide Rates in Juarez, State of Chihuahua and Mexico.41 
 
 
As the graph depicts, violence peaked for Juarez in 2010, especially compared to the state 
of Chihuahua and Mexico. However, this violence began to rapidly decline following the 
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expansion of the Merida Initiative to include the three pillars that focused on community 
efforts. By tailoring security diplomacy to satisfy the needs of Mexico, the United States 
was able to positively impact the citizens of Mexico by helping to bring security and 
stability to a violent city.42 In addition to the decline of homicides, “more than 90 per cent 
of state and municipal security forces in Chihuahua have been certified, having passed 
background checks and polygraph tests, slightly higher than the national average of 88 
per cent.”43 
 
The results of the Mexico’s war against trans-national organized crime are still 
undecided, but what is certain is the success the United States has had in developing 
stronger ties with the Mexican government despite historic differences. These differences 
have been overcome through multiple diplomacy avenues such as security and economic, 
and I foresee the United States and Mexico growing closer as their defense and law 
enforcement establishments continue to train and operate together. 
 
Rivals Use of Defense Diplomacy in Latin America Case Study 
Since September 11, 2001 the United States security policy has been primarily focused 
on counter-terrorism in the Middle East and South East Asia, leaving our partners 
throughout Latin America and the Caribbean with the impression that the United States is 
not a reliable security partner in the region. In doing so, competitors, such as the Peoples 
Republic of China (PRC), have taken full advantage of the U.S. absence by deepening 
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their ties to the region through strong economic and military partnerships.44  In addition 
to the PRC increasing activity in LATAM, Russia and Iran have also sought to increase 
their influence with many states through the use of defense diplomacy.  
 
Russia’s relationship with Latin America dates back to the early 1800s when the Russian 
Empire recognized the Brazilian Empire and the newly independent Mexico. Toward the 
end of the nineteenth century, Russia had diplomatic and trade relations throughout the 
region, and during World War I they notably increased their diplomatic efforts as the 
Soviets came to power. This especially became apparent during the Cold War as the 
Soviet Union increased its military presence in an attempt to secure beachheads. In fact, 
many countries looked at the Soviet Union’s presence as a counterweight to the United 
States, and actively sought to increase diplomatic relations.45 These relations simmered 
after the Cold War as Russia concentrated on domestic programs, but over the past 
decade the international community has witnessed a Russia reassert itself in LATAM 
with defense diplomacy being one of its key pillars. 
 
According to Alejandro Sanchez, over the past decade while the U.S. has been focused 
on combating global terrorism, the Russian Federation has been proactive in fostering 
Latin American relationships through multiple diplomatic initiatives. Specifically in 
defense diplomacy, Russia has taken full advantage of the rise in anti-American 
sentiment by providing military weapons and training to countries seeking partnership. 
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Through defense cooperation, Russia has increased its relevance in LATAM, and sent a 
clear message to the United States that once again it’s a global player.46 To add even 
more credence to this argument of Russia using defense diplomacy through arms sales 
and loans, in Putin Makes Energy and Arms Deals with Potential Latin American Allies, 
the author highlights Russia’s use of defense diplomacy as a key instrument, even when 
not economically justified, to gain greater clout in Latin America.47 
 
Over the past decade the PRC has increased its defense diplomacy in Latin America, but 
unlike Russia, they do not seek to have an antagonistic relationship with the United 
States. As early as 2000, the PRC began to slowly court LATAM through defense 
diplomacy. While the PRCs arms sales were far from those of Western countries, the 
Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) sought other avenues to increase its influence. These 
methods are providing military education to Latin American officers, offering 
“friendship” discounts on military equipment, allowing Latin American navies to utilize 
their ports, and host/conduct official military visits. Through a defense diplomacy 
strategy, the PRC increased its influence in the region, which has resulted in a steady 
increase in military arms sales.48  
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Like China and Russia, Iran has used defense diplomacy in an effort to build diplomatic 
relationships in the region. While there efforts are not as large as the Russian Federation 
or the PRC, Iran has increased its defense cooperation and presence in Latin America. 
This can be seen by the doubling of its embassy presence from 6 in 2005 to 12 in 2010 as 
well as its use of defense diplomacy through the use of the Revolutionary Guard 
providing training to the Venezuelan secret service and police.49 I propose Iran’s 
diplomatic overtures, in relation to defense, are more similar to the U.S.’s use of security 
diplomacy compared to Russia or China’s use of defense diplomacy.  
 
Due to the United States policy efforts being focused being focused in the Middle East 
and South West Asia, these rivals have looked to build defense based relationships, in 
what they believe is the United States natural spheres of influence.  As seen above, 
defense diplomacy has been one of the ways in which they have been able to challenge 
the U.S.’s hegemon.  
 
 
Russian & Chinese Defense Diplomacy with Venezuela (2004 – 2014)  
By far, Russia is the largest supplier of military technology and weaponry to the 
Venezuelan government, which fears external threats from the United States and 
Colombia.  In regards to arms sales, the Russian Federation has sold and trained the 
Venezuelan military the Su-30 fighter jet, small arms, and surface-to-air missiles. In 
addition to selling Venezuela weapon systems, they also struck a deal that would build a 
Kalashnikov rifle factory in Venezuela, the first one of its kind in the Western 
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Hemisphere, that would give the Venezuelan military the ability to build their own small 
arms. Looking beyond weapons sales between the two countries, in November 2008, the 
Russian navy, led by a nuclear-powered cruiser conducted a port call in Venezuela, 
followed by a joint exercise with the Venezuelan navy.50 Through defense related 
diplomatic efforts, Russia is seen by the Venezuelan government as a dependable ally, 
and a counterweight to their perception of the United States threat.  
 
 
China like the United States uses professional military education as one of its tools for 
defense diplomacy. In an effort to develop stronger ties with Venezuela, the PLA has sent 
its own officers to Venezuela while sending Venezuelan military officers to their military 
schools as well as prestigious civilian schools in order to learn the language and culture.51  
In addition to using military education as a diplomatic tool, China is providing arms at a 
discounted rate known as “friendship prices” in order to break into the regional market. 
According to Loro Horto, this strategy has worked as the Venezuelan military has 
purchased high-end items such as aircraft to low-end earthmovers. This approach to 
defense diplomacy was so successful that the former President Chavez showed interest in 
purchasing other high-end military equipment such as missiles and electronic warfare 
equipment.52 
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Russia and the PRC’s approach to defense diplomacy has been very successful in 
advancing both countries influence in the region. By equipping, training, and conducting 
professional military officer exchanges LATAM countries have begun to look towards 
Russia and the PRC as reliable partners who can help them advance their security 
internally and externally; furthermore, some countries who perceive the United States as 
a threat, see them as means to counter U.S. dominance in the region.  
  
CONCLUSION 
Defense diplomacy has evolved from its early days as a mechanism for collecting and 
monitoring allied nations, into an all encompassing diplomatic approach that I call 
security diplomacy. When tailored to its customer, security diplomacy has been 
successful in attaining U.S. policy objectives whilst creating a positive relationship with 
partners that fosters greater diplomacy. Through security diplomacy, the United States 
has created stability, broken down historical barriers, and should be used as a diplomatic 






















“The challenges and opportunities of African nations parallel the immensity of their 
geography and the dynamic complexity of their people. Their stability and security are 
strategic interests for the United States; and the U.S. African Command, along with its 
component commands, plays a critical role in helping address those challenges. The 
Command seeks to increase stability and decrease threats to American citizens and U.S. 
national interests through its partnerships with the African nations’ security sectors and 
their regional organizations”53 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
Can the United States use security diplomacy to further its influence in Africa, while 




As Africa is evolving and gaining greater influence geo-politically, African countries are 
rapidly becoming more important to the United States. It has six of the tens fastest 
growing economies; a population of one billion that will double by 2050; and the largest 
regional voting bloc in multilateral organizations that will only gain greater power as the 
continent flourishes. Despite this potential, a number of transnational threats exist across 
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the continent that impede progress, and will require political discourse as well as military 
intervention to counter.54  
 
According to a 2010 study by the University of Maryland, Africa faces some of the most 
serious security challenges in the world, and no region has a greater potential for conflict. 
Of 162 countries, 25 rated to have the highest risk of instability with only three outside of 
sub-Saharan Africa.55 
 
Recognizing the regional volatility, the United States can utilize security diplomacy as 
way to assist struggling African nations in securing their state, which in turn will create 
the conditions necessary for stability and development. Through security diplomacy, the 
U.S. has an opportunity to build trust through its actions, and to become a strategic 
regional partner.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Africa, similar to Latin America, experienced colonization from outside nations that 
sought to rule its lands and people through coercive diplomacy. Beginning in the 19th 
century, colonial rule swept over the African continent due to European economic, 
political, and social issues. Primarily it was driven from the demand for raw resources to 
fuel industry; a desire for greater markets to export their goods; and the rise of 
unemployed citizens from the transition of an agricultural based economy to an industrial 
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based economy motivated European nation-states to colonize Africa as a means to 
maintain civil control of large populations of unemployed citizens.56 
 
Colonial rule continued throughout Africa for the duration of the 19th and into the 20th 
century without being successfully challenged until the conclusion of Second Great War. 
Following World War II, African countries began to slowly gain independence, with the 
exception of South Africa, through various ways and means – some peaceful – some 
violent.57 Then in 1994 South Africa ended its Apartheid policy, held its first multi-racial 
election, and ended the last remnants of European rule over the African continent.58  
 
As a consequence of colonization in Africa, most African countries are hyper vigilant of 
any action that could be perceived as intruding on their sovereignty, so it is of upmost 
importance that the United States recognize the importance of their partners history when 
conducting security diplomacy. Acknowledging Africa’s history, the United States can 
use security diplomacy to increase its political influence with partner states by assisting 
them in creating a stable and secure environment. Furthermore, the United States can 
avoid the perception of using gunboat diplomacy by being transparent in its actions as 
well as using its security institutions to aid its partners during humanitarian disasters, like 
the 2014 Ebola outbreak. 
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SECURITY DIPLOMACY 
Before proceeding, it’s important to review Chapter 1’s definition of security diplomacy, 
and distinguish it from coercive diplomacy. Security diplomacy, like defense diplomacy, 
seeks to build partnerships through the use of security related programs, and does not use 
the threat of force to intimidate its partners into cooperation. On the other hand, coercive 
diplomacy seeks to change the behavior of an international actor(s) through the threat of 
violence, or the use of limited military action. Unlike security diplomacy that builds 
relationships through security cooperation, coercive diplomacy seeks to apply its military 
superiority to shape the environment through fear of conflict.59   
 
Examples of coercive diplomacy in Africa are the tactics used by extremist groups such 
as Al – Shabaab, in East Africa, as well as Boko Haram, in Nigeria, to effect the political 
and social environment through fear violence. These tactics include but are not limited to 
kidnapping, murder, intimidation, and extortion of the local population in an attempt to 
portray the government as weak. If successful, citizens lose faith in their government’s 
ability to provide security, and an opening arises for the legitimization of a change in 
government. Nations that face these issues must identify and resolve the issues as fast as 
possible. While not ideal conditions, security diplomacy can help struggling 
governments, through partnership, in developing kinetic and non-kinetic strategies to 
counter the threats.  
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As discussed in Chapter 1, defense diplomacy has been used by nations in various 
capacities since the seventeenth century. Over time the nature of diplomacy and conflict 
has evolved to mirror the social and cultural norms of the period it’s in.  For instance, 
from 1961 until the conclusion of the Cold War defense diplomacy remained relatively 
the same, minus the new diplomatic status, as it was in the seventeenth century; however, 
a major shift occurred during the twentieth century as the role of the Military Attaché 
evolved from intelligence into one with greater diplomatic responsibilities.60  
 
I argue this shift occurred as a direct result of the world transitioning to a bipolar 
international system to a hegemon. Consequently, upheaval arose as nations and 
disenfranchised population bases began to push the international norms that were 
established during the Cold War. The second and third order effects, from this shift, were 
requirements from U.S. partners that went beyond defense. They needed assistance not 
only with their military, but law enforcement, intelligence, and other aspects of security. I 
contend this is another development in defense diplomacy, and as mentioned in Chapter 
1, the U.S. must diplomatically approach this as security diplomacy, with defense being a 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Reviewing Chapter 1, Mr. Shapiro asserts that the United States, as it retrogrades from its 
current conflicts, has an opportunity to form new partnerships by shifting its attention to 
building or improving new or old diplomatic relations. In support of these diplomatic 
efforts, one of key negotiation instruments for the Department of State will be security 
diplomacy. Furthermore, he counters the theories of the U.S. losing global stature by 
arguing that more than ever countries are seeking to partner with the U.S. on matters of 
security.61 
 
Mr. Shapiro argues the United States can gain influence by assisting its allies and 
partners through Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military Finances, which would 
enable them to operationally partner with one another. By operating from the same 
weapons platforms, they would have the ability to cooperate, as the defense systems 
would be able to communicate with one another. Also, the United States would have to 
train our partners on the systems, thus creating more opportunities to deepen partnerships.  
Professional Military Education is another program, Mr. Shapiro sees as an opportunity 
to further ties by exchanging military officers for professional education. Military 
education exchanges help the U.S. and its partners to improve their language ability, gain 
an appreciation for one another’s cultures, and develop professional relationships with 
one another that can be used as the officer’s advance in rank and responsibility.62 For 
further details on defense diplomacy tools, please refer to Chapter 1’s Table 1. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Shapiro, Andrew J. 2012. “A New Era for U.S. Security Assistance.” The Washington Quarterly 35:4: 
23-35. (Accessed February 26, 2014). DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2012.725021 
62 Ibid, pg. 26-29 
	   36	  
Also, Michael O’Hanlon, the Director of Research for Foreign Policy, declares the time is 
ripe for the United States to move beyond its history of lip service to African security, 
and begin conducting a well thought out diplomatic strategy using security diplomacy, 
specifically military intervention, as one of the driving forces behind change. In the 
article, he provides examples of how France and the European Union have successfully 
used security diplomacy to help stabilize the security situation in some African 
countries.63 
 
He believes the United States could help African countries achieve great gains in the fight 
against terrorism as well the humanitarian front with little investment. Specifically, he 
believes the United States could deploy units numbering from the hundreds to a couple 
thousand personnel to conduct peacekeeping missions as well as train – advise- and assist 
missions designed to give African nations security forces the tools needed to successfully 
stabilize and secure their own countries.64  
 
Countering Michael O’Hanlon’s argument, Dr. Nsia – Pepra states that the United States 
neorealist approach has failed. Instead, the United States must take the liberal approach 
of using soft power to achieve its end-state in Africa, which is the promotion of liberal 
ideas. She believes the militarization of Africa is counterintuitive of the U.S. idea of 
spreading liberal values throughout the African continent, and it has backfired on them 
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gaining credibility with their partners and allies. Furthermore, she argues that the United 
States militarization of the continent is a direct result of the fight on terrorism, desire for 
its oil reserves, and to counter China’s emergence in Africa.65 
 
Security Diplomacy & International Relations (IR) Theory 
Before proceeding, I believe it’s important to look at security diplomacy through the lens 
of the major international relations theories. “The study of international relations takes a 
wide range of theoretical approaches. Some emerge from within the discipline itself; 
others have been imported, in whole or in part, from disciplines such as economics or 
sociology. Indeed, few social scientific theories have not been applied to the study of 
relations amongst nations. Many theories of international relations are internally and 
externally contested, and few scholars believe only in one or another. In spite of this 
diversity, several major schools of thought are discernible, differentiated principally by 
the variable they emphasize – eg military power, material interests, or ideological 
beliefs.” 66   
 
In this section, I’ll concentrate on the four IR theories, and demonstrate how they relate 
to security diplomacy. All four have influenced the study and execution of security 
diplomacy by varying degrees, and can be seen in the actions of today’s world leaders. 
The four IR theories I will cover are realism, liberalism, institutionalism, and idealism. 
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Realism argues that nations are autonomous actors, and state power is the center of 
gravity in an international system defined by anarchy. Only through power 
(military/economic/diplomatic), can states defend themselves, and protect their interests 
from outsiders seeking to attain their own goals.  Realists view the world on the following 
four assumptions: 1) state survival is above all else; 2) states are rational actors; 3) all 
states possess some military capacity, and ambiguity is always present; 4) states with the 
greatest economic and military power dictate the terms of international relations.67  
 
I propose the Russian Federation’s approach to international politics is an example of 
realism.  Rather than using diplomacy, economic or security, to create a stable region 
based on cooperation, Russia chooses to destabilize the region through coercive 
diplomacy by using the strength of its military to intimidate its weaker neighbors into 
capitulating to its political desires. Two examples of this are Russia’s economic and 
military actions in Georgia and the Ukraine.    
 
The second major international relations theory is Liberalism, which has influenced all 
democracies. Like most theories, Liberalism is not a single IR theory; rather it’s made up 
of several interpretations that are based on individual rights. This includes but is not 
limited to individual equality before the law, private property, elected representation, and 
civil liberties such as free speech. Three ideas on liberalism are Liberal Pacifism, Liberal 
Imperialism, and Immanuel Kant’s theory of Liberal Internationalism.68 
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The basic premise behind liberal internationalism is democratic states will not engage in 
aggressive actions towards one another, and will align with one another during conflicts, 
despite previous political grievances. This was witnessed in the President Carter and 
Reagan presidencies when grievances existed between the United States, and many of its 
European partners. Despite the differing agendas, democratic alliances like NATO still 
flourished. According to Kant’s interpretation, this occurred because perpetual peace can 
exist between states if three conditions are satisfied. First nation-states civil constitutions 
must be based on republican ideas (not the U.S. political party); pacification between the 
republics would then occur as liberal republics made peace; and finally a cosmopolitan 
law would be established as a result of the pacification of the republics. This in turn 
would produce a perpetual peace that could only be disrupted by nation-states that break 
away from the republican ideas or shun them all together.69 
 
The author of Liberalism and World Politics highlights several instances in modern 
history that support Kant’s theory of democratic states negotiating disputes (Britain and 
the U.S. during the North’s blockade of Southern cotton going to Britain during the Civil 
War), and aligning with one another against non-democratic states despite a long history 
of rivalry (Anglo – French entente against Germany before World War I). Both examples 
demonstrate liberal societies coming together under a belief in order to stop or defend 
against non-liberal competitors.  
 
More recently, the actions the United States took in Iraq with the former Prime Minister 
Maliki demonstrate the U.S. resolve in not wanting to work with leadership, of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Ibid, pg. 1155 – 1158  
	   40	  
democracy, that was not promoting liberal ideas of individual equality. Until he resigned 
from office, the U.S. refused to provide full military aid. Immediately following his 
resignation, the U.S. government increased its financial and military aid to Iraq in order 
to help them fight the ISIS terrorist threat.70   
 
The next IR theory I will discuss is institutionalism. Like realism, it proposes that the 
international system is anarchic, a states priority is survival, and ambiguity surrounds 
nation-states on the international level. Unlike realism, institutionalism argues that 
cooperation between states can exist on the international stage under the right 
conditions.71  
 
“Institutionalists, in contrast, argue that institutions – defined as a set of rules, norms, 
practices and decision-making procedures that shape expectations – can overcome the 
uncertainty that undermines co-operation.”72  
 
Nation-states knowing they will have extended contact are more likely to positively 
interact with other states, since they know further interaction will occur over time. 
Additionally, the theory argues that information increases between states as they interact 
with one another, causing ambiguity to decrease between states. Through cooperation 
states gain greater clarity into their partners decision cycle, helping to identify other 
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nations political desires and red lines in comparison to their own, thus creating 
efficiencies when negotiating with one another.73  
 
I argue that the United States use of security diplomacy follows this theory closer than 
any other. Institutionalism aligns closely with Kant’s Liberal Internationalism in the 
sense that liberal states are closer to one another, and will work through differences 
knowing that they are founded under common principles. NATO during the Cold War 
was a good illustration of Institutionalism theory at its best. Despite having political 
agenda’s that did not necessarily align, the U.S. and Western European countries were 
able to work through differences in order to create an institution that served as a defense 
against the Warsaw Pact. This institution was successful, although not perfect, that it 
continues to exist, despite its original threat no longer existing.  
 
The final IR theory I will highlight is idealism. Idealism is based on principled activism, 
and some of its biggest proponents have been individuals or movements like Mahatma 
Gandhi, Osama Bin Laden, and Anti-globalization movements. Some of the biggest 
contributor’s to the theory have been Kathryn Sikkink, Michael Barnett, and Martha 
Finnemore.74 
 
The foundation of idealism is based on a state or group’s foreign policy being guided by 
values, ethics, and legal standards. In recent years a new version of idealism has arose to 
IR theory known as constructivism. This new adaptation proposes that social reality 
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derives from debate about values, and international change is a result of intellectuals who 
publically push for new ideas as well as publically identify and humiliate (when possible) 
actors whose actions go against the international standard.75 
 
The recent rise and spread of ISIS is an example of idealism. Its ability to spread and 
enforce its version of Islam regionally has been astonishing. Through social media they 
have been able to spread their values and version of Islam to a global audience, which has 
resulted in individuals flocking to the region in defense of the organization. If unable to 
travel to the battlefields, followers have conducted their own attacks in the name of the 
organization. While this is not a rosy example, it demonstrates the power of idealism as 
an IR theory and its effect on the international system. 
 
Research Methodology 
Using a qualitative approach for this thesis, I seek to prove that security diplomacy can be 
used to gain greater influence with partners despite historical barriers such as Cold War 
rivalries and colonization. Chapters 1 examined whether historical barriers would prevent 
the United States from using security diplomacy as a means to gain influence with 
partners in Latin America. In this study, I found that security diplomacy was effective in 
building partnerships with LATAM partners, despite past grievances, and could be used 
in a tailored approach with other countries throughout the region. Specifically for this 
chapter, I will attempt to determine whether the United States can use security diplomacy 
as a diplomatic tool for assisting partners in creating a secure and stable environment that 
promotes a healthy rapport between countries.   
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HYPOTHESIS 
My hypothesis is the United States can increase its credibility and influence in Africa 
through the use of security diplomacy. It alone or in synchronization with other forms of 
diplomacy can build trust between partners, while assisting in the creation of a secure 
environment that promotes democratic values and ideas.  
 
HISTORY OF U.S. – AFRICA DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 
With the exception of the United States providing support to former slaves seeking to 
establish a colony in Liberia, following the U.S. Civil War, its diplomatic involvement in 
Africa had been minimal until the Cold War.76  
 
Decolonization in Africa, like Asia, followed no particular path to self-governance. In 
some places, both European colonizers as well as the Africans welcomed the transition, 
but in others, protracted bloody conflicts erupted into a struggle for independence. To 
further complicate the issue of independence, it coincided with the start of the Cold War, 
which often complicated the United States’ decision calculus in supporting the concept of 
national self-determination over containing the spread of communism. 77  
 
Many former African colonies, along with Asian, foresaw the upcoming struggle between 
the Soviet Union and the West, and declared themselves non-aligned during the Bandung 
conference in 1955 while making a case that they were going to focus on internal 
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development. Initially the U.S. received this with caution, but in the end the conference 
proved to be a success for the former colonies by giving them a voice as well as a choice 
during the Cold War.78 
 
From the 1950s until the 1970s, newly established, non-aligned countries began to 
increase across Africa. With these newly established countries came proxy wars between 
the United States and the Soviet Union. Two of these struggles were the conflicts in 
Congo and Angola. In both cases, the United States sought to block the spread of 
communism by financing and supplying leaders with weapons to achieve victory over the 
communist backed parties. While the Congo, later renamed Zaire, led by Joseph Mobutu 
was successful in preventing communism from taking root, Angola was considered a 
failure following the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola’s, backed by the 
Soviet Union, victory over the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, backed by the 
United States.7980 
 
Following the conclusion of the Cold War, three significant diplomatic events came to 
the forefront between African countries and the United States. The first was the end of 
the Apartheid in South Africa, which resulted in the United States lifting sanctions and 
increased foreign aid to include many U.S. companies returning following their 
disinvestment in the 1980s.81  
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Somalia was the second significant event.  In this case, the United States was supporting 
the U.N. peacekeeping mission following the collapse of the central government. It was 
providing both food aid as well as famine relief, but this was short lived following U.S. 
service members being killed following a breakdown in security. While the U.S. removed 
itself from the peacekeeping role, they still continued to provide aid to the people of 
Somalia.82  
 
The third and final diplomatic event that shaped current African policies was the stand-up 
of the United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), which will be discussed later as a 
case study. Establishing USAFRICOM was significant for the United States in its overall 
strategy towards Africa, specifically, Sub-Saharan Africa. In June of 2012, during the 
Africa Strategy, President Obama proclaimed, “As we look toward the future, it is clear 
that Africa is more important than ever to the security and prosperity of the international 
community, and to the United States in particular.”83   
 
“This new strategy focuses on Washington partnering with sub-Saharan African countries 
to pursue the following pillars: (1) strengthen democratic institutions; (2) spur economic 
growth, trade, and investment; (3) advance peace and stability; and (4) promote 
opportunity and development.”84  
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Looking at the third pillar of the new strategy, it’s comprised of multiple lines of effort 
that fall under security diplomacy. These are:  
• Advance regional security cooperation and security sector reform; Support 
initiatives that promote peace and security; Prevent transnational criminal threats; 
Prevent conflict; Prevent mass atrocities; Hold individuals accountable for their 
actions; And counterterrorism.85 
 
U.S. USE OF SECURITY DIPLOMACY IN AFRICA 
In this section, I present my case studies, and seek to prove that security diplomacy can 
be used as a diplomatic tool to achieve greater influence in Africa. Specifically I will look 
at the stand-up of the United States Africa Command; the Kenyan – U.S. security 
relationship; and China’s defense relationship across the continent.  
 
United States African Command 
Prior to the stand-up of USAFRICOM, the DoD divided African security policy between 
the European, Central, and Pacific Combatant Commands (COCOMs), which created the 
possibility for potential gaps and lost diplomatic opportunities from a poor unity of 
effort.86  Recognizing the flaw, the U.S. established USAFRICOM on October 01, 2008 
under a presidential directive.87 The mission, “United States Africa Command, in concert 
with interagency and international partners, builds defense capabilities, responds to crisis, 
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and deters and defeats transnational threats in order to advance U.S. national interests and 
promote regional security, stability, and prosperity.”88  
 
Initially, USAFRICOM was met with suspicion and concern on the exact role it would 
play in Africa. Due to this suspicion, not a single African country, with the exception of 
Liberia, offered the COCOM a location for its headquarters, and multiple partners, like 
South Africa and Nigeria, openly criticized the COCOM. Furthermore, U.S. based 
NGO’s and umbrella associates reacted with caution, fearing disadvantages might arise 
from excessive proximity vis-à-vis actors and policies of U.S. security.89 Further fueling 
the suspicion was the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars. This caused many people to fear for the 
militarization of Africa under the pretenses of counterterrorism. To alleviate this 
apprehension, the USAFRICOM headquarters was placed in Stuttgart, Germany where it 
remains today.90 
 
Over time this trepidation proved false, and in 2011 Sharon Cromer, the USAID Senior 
Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa, provided the following testimony to the U.S. 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and 
Human Rights on their relationship with USAFRICOM.91 “USAID greatly values the 
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work of USAFRICOM as the link between security and development is clear throughout 
Africa. War, terrorism, and violence threaten current progress and impede potential gains 
in health, education, democracy, and economic growth. But with improved security, 
African nations can begin to experience sound economic growth, better living conditions, 
and improved governance following years of devastating armed conflict.”92  
 
To provide further insight into USAFRICOM’s focus in the region, GEN Rodriguez, 
Commander USAFRICOM, provided the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) 
with his commands priorities in an unclassified environment, which provides 
transparency to the world. The below four lines of effort presented to the SASC were:93 
• Countering Violent Extremism 
• Improving Stability in East, West, North Africa, and in the Gulf of Guinea 
• Protecting U.S. Personnel and facilities 
• Countering the Lords Resistance Army in Central Africa 
 
In order to accomplish these lines of effort, USAFRICOM focuses on security diplomacy, 
primarily defense, programs such as military to military engagements, exercises, and 
operations with and through its African partners.  In 2013 alone, USAFRICOM touched 
all three lines of efforts by conducting 55 operations, 10 exercises, and 481 security 
cooperation activities. Through these tailored efforts, the Command was been able to 
make gains with modest investment.94  
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As Africa continues to grow in importance, USAFRICOM working with the interagency 
and its African partners will become the continent’s center of gravity for security 
diplomacy.  Working closely with interagency partners, such as USAID, DEA, and the 
FBI, USAFRICOM can help create a stable environment that promotes rule-of-law, 
human rights, and has the ability to respond to regional crises.   
 
West Africa Ebola Response Case Study 
In March 2014 the world witnessed the most deadly Ebola outbreak, since its discovery 
in 1976. This epidemic swept through West Africa, and has claimed 5 times more victims 
than any other outbreak combined. More than 10,250 have died from this virus, and the 
total number of reported cases has exceeded 24,740; in addition, it’s believed that many 
more cases have gone unreported.95 
 
In response to this disaster, the United States government, along with NGOs, began to 
mobilize, personnel and resources, in an effort to combat this epidemic. The first USAID 
led 28 – person team, known as Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART), hit the 
ground in August and September 2014. This team consisting of USAID, DoD, Centers of 
Disease Control, the Public Health Service, and the U.S. Forest Service arrived to assess 
the situation on the ground and coordinate the U.S. government’s response to the crisis.96   
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This team make-up is a great example of how security diplomacy, specifically DoD, can 
serve as an enabler for other agency led efforts in order to achieve U.S. government 
policy objectives.  
 
Since December 2014, the Department of Defense, in support of a civilian led effort, has 
spent $313 million on the Ebola epidemic in West Africa. DoD successfully trained 1,539 
healthcare workers and support staff; formed 30 member medical support teams for short-
term assistance; established more than 10 DoD Ebola treatment units; procured 1.4 
million sets of personal protective equipment; and 7 mobile labs that processed over 
4,709 samples.97 These resources, along with the interagency approach, resulted in a 
drastic decrease of confirmed cases throughout West Africa. The below data best 
illustrates this claim. 
• Liberia – Prior to response there were 119 confirmed cases per week; now ~3 
• Sierra Leone – Prior to response 534 confirmed cases per week; now ~ 76 
• Guinea – Prior to response 148 confirmed cases per week; now ~ 6698 
 
This whole of government approach, with security diplomacy in a support role, 
demonstrates the effectiveness of synchronizing U.S. efforts in order to assist its partners 
in Africa. Although in a support role, security diplomacy played a critical role in 
providing equipment, training, and people to help its partners get control of a deadly 
humanitarian crisis. Recognizing the contribution security diplomacy played in this 
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effort, both the President of Liberia and the Director of USAID publically praised it for 
its contribution to the fight.99 100 
 
Kenya Case Study 
In 1964, following Kenya’s independence from the United Kingdom, the U.S. established 
diplomatic relations with the newly formed Kenyan government. This relationship has 
been relatively stable with the exception of the violence and corruption that ensued 
following the 2007 elections.  This led to the United States strongly advocating for 
institutional and political reform, and resulted in Kenya’s coalition government adopting 
a new constitution in 2010.101  
 
The United States views Kenya as a strategic partner, an anchor state in East Africa, and 
a key partner in counterterrorism efforts throughout the region. As of 2013, Kenya was 
ranked internationally among the top 10 U.S. foreign aid recipients, and received a wide 
array of aid from the United States.  According to Table 2, estimates show that U.S. aid 
to Kenya surpassed $1 billion in recent years with the majority of the assistance going to 
development and health programs. Although security related assistance makes up only a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Pellerin, Cheryl. (2014). “Liberia is Making Progress Against Ebola but Cases Continue.” U.S. 
Department of Defense, DoD News. (Accessed April 22, 2015). 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=123625 
100 Pellerin, Cheryl. (2015). “Liberia’s President Thanks Obama, Carter for Ebola Aid.” U.S. Department of 
Defense, DoD News. (Accessed April 22, 2015). 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=128271  
101 United States Africa Command, “Republic of Kenya,” Accessed 17 August 2014, 
http://www.africom.mil/africa/east-africa/republic-of-kenya 
	   52	  
fraction of the total aid Kenya receives, they’re one of the largest recipients of U.S. 
security related aid in Africa.102  
 
Over the last decade, the United States has used security diplomacy, primarily defense, to 
help Kenya’s security institutions secure its national territory and to counter Islamic 
terrorism; furthermore, the it’s provided support to help facilitate the Kenyan Navy in 
securing its territorial waters, while countering piracy emanating from Somalia.103 These 
counter piracy efforts along with the combined effects of multi-national military 
operations, the capture and prosecution of many suspected pirates, and improved industry 
security measures have led to a significant decline in vessel hijackings and the 
kidnapping of crewmembers since 2011. To demonstrate this success with numbers, there 
were 0 ships hijacked in 2013, out of 9 attempts; in comparison, in 2011 there were 27 
successful hijackings and 166 attempts.104 
 
In addition to counterterrorism and traditional military training, security diplomacy has 
assisted Kenya in battling disease and sickness through medical research and training. 
Under USAFRICOM and by invite of the Kenyan government, the U.S. Army Medical 
Research Unit – Kenya (USAMRU-K), located on the campus of the Kenya Medical 
Research Institute, works with the Kenyan military and medical sector to develop and test 
improved methods for preventing, identifying and treating infectious diseases. 
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Furthermore, they partner with the Kenyan government to execute the President’s 
Emergency Plan for Aids Relief as with as the Malaria Initiative, which seeks to prevent 
and treat the spread of HIV as well as Malaria.105  
 
Utilizing security diplomacy, I argue the United States was successful in improving its 
relationship with Kenya, and assisting the government with improving its security 
environment to promote stability and growth. To support this statement, below are two 
reports on economic growth, and the development of greater depth for medical personnel 
to counter malaria.  
 
In June 2014 Kenya was one of two countries in sub-Saharan Africa that have the highest 
medium-term gross domestic product growth rates. According to Advance Emerging 
Capital, Kenya has one of the most attractive frontier markets in the next 5 years, and its 
middle class has the highest proportion of entrepreneurs of any frontier market. To 
further demonstrate Kenya’s economic growth, they are attracting both the information 
technology and energy sectors, and according to Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Kenyan 
companies’ 2014 earnings are expected to grow by 19%.106 
 
From October to November 2013, USAFRICOM sponsored a “Train the Trainer” event 
focused on diagnosing malaria. The purpose of this event was to create a pool of qualified 
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East Africans who would return to their countries, and provide training to medical 
personnel on the techniques they learned at the event. Through this training, 
USAFRICOM and its East African partners hope to create an institutional knowledge 
base and bench strength of personnel that can improve their own citizen’s quality of life 
through the reduction of malaria.107   
Table 2. U.S. Bilateral Foreign Assistance to Kenya, State Department and USAID 
($ in millions)108 
 








Development Assistance (DA) 75.8 92 92.9 89.8 
Economic Support Fund (ESF) - 4.8 - - 
Food for Peace (FFP) - 77.5 - - 
Global Health Programs (GHP) – State 498.8 241.5 277.4 382.1 
Global Health Programs (GHP) – USAID 75.3 78.2 79.4 81.4 
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 1 1.5 1.1 1.2 
International Military Education & Training (IMET) 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 
International Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement 
(INCLE) 2 2 1.8 2 
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining & 
Related Programs (NADR) 8 1.2 6.2 6.5 
NADR – Overseas Contingency Operations 
(OCO) 
- 7.8 - - 
TOTAL 661.8 507.2 459.5 563.8 
 
While not perfect, I argue that U.S. security diplomacy has led to improvements in 
Kenya’s security institutions, and helped the country advance socially and economically. 
Security diplomacy has helped in building a lasting diplomatic relationship between the 
two countries as well as assisted the U.S. in gaining greater influence in the region.  
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China and Africa 
Recognizing the global significance of Africa, China has been pro-active in its diplomatic 
engagements with African governments. Between 2000 and 2008 trade with Africa 
increased 11 – fold, and was estimated to be US$127 billion; furthermore, Africa has 
become a key supplier of energy to China. In order to protect its personal interests, China 
recognized the need for regional stability, and has turned to defense diplomacy as a 
means of insurance.109 
 
In a 2010 Defense White Paper, Beijing emphasized the importance of Military 
Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), and demonstrated its ability to conduct these 
operations by participating in UN Peacekeeping and disaster relief operations. 
Additionally, the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has protected its economic 
interests via counter-piracy operations. These operations resulted in protecting 3,139 
ships sailing under various flags; the rescue of 29 ships from pirate attacks; and the 
recovery of 9 ships released from captivity. Also, the PLA Navy is in the process of 
building its first overseas naval facility in Seychelles to assist in anti-piracy operations 
and resource exploration.110 
 
In addition to participating in the above operations, China has begun courting historical 
U.S. allies such as Uganda and Ethiopia through military education exchanges. In 
addition, China differs in its approach to military education exchanges.  Rather than 
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dictating the training Ethiopian and Ugandan military officers receive, China grants their 
partners with the freedom of choice when choosing training. As a consequence, in 2010 
the Ethiopian and Chinese military pledged to strengthen their military relationship.111  
 
As one can see from the paragraphs above, China understands the value that security 
diplomacy can provide in achieving its diplomatic goals. However, they differ from the 
U.S. in their approach, and provide African leaders with an alternative that is less 
concerned with pushing their political values as they are with protecting their economic 
interests. China will continue to operate in the region, and, if in its interest, attempt to 
provide U.S. partners with an alternative option to security diplomacy.    
 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, I believe that security diplomacy has proven to be an effective enabler to 
the United States overarching diplomatic efforts in Sub – Saharan Africa. As seen in 
Kenya and West Africa, security diplomacy can be multifaceted by providing both non-
kinetic as well as kinetic support to its partners in combating everything from terrorists, 
insurgents, or outbreaks of deadly diseases. Security diplomacy has proven it can be 
effective in creating secure and stable environments that lay the foundation for economic 
expansion, education, rule-of-law, and human rights. However, like Latin America, the 
United States must be aware of Africa’s history at all times, and ensure its actions are not 
perceived as coercive in nature.    
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
“The United States maintains a profound commitment to a Europe that is free, whole, and 
at peace. A strong Europe is our indispensable partner, including for tackling global 
security challenges, promoting prosperity, and upholding international norms. Our work 
with Europe leverages our strong and historic bilateral relationships throughout the 
continent. We will steadfastly support the aspirations of countries in the Balkans and 
Eastern Europe toward European and Euro-Atlantic integration, continue to transform our 
relationship with Turkey, and enhance ties with countries in the Caucasus while 





Since the 2008 Russo – Georgian Conflict, Russia has begun to reassert itself regionally 
by manipulating the natural gas market, and using its military strength to execute its 
policies through coercive diplomacy. This is especially evident in their actions toward 
Ukraine and its allies. In addition to the annexation of sovereign territory, Russia has 
returned to the tactics of the Cold War by having their strategic bombers fly dangerously 
close to the airspace of other countries, especially NATO members. It is my belief that 
without a strong response from the U.S. and the international community, Russia will 
continue using gunboat diplomacy to carry out its national agenda. I further propose that 
security diplomacy, along with other forms of diplomacy, can assist in stabilizing the 
region by providing partners with the resources and training needed to stabilize 
themselves domestically as well as defend their borders from Russian aggression.  
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Research Question  
Can the U.S. use security diplomacy to increase its influence in Eastern Europe in the 




As you have read in the previous chapters, Mr. Shapiro asserts that the United States, as it 
retrogrades from its current conflicts, has an opportunity to form new partnerships by 
shifting its attention to building or improving new or old diplomatic relations. In support 
of these diplomatic efforts, one of key negotiation instruments for the Department of 
State will be security diplomacy. Furthermore, he counters the theories of the U.S. losing 
global stature by arguing that more than ever countries are seeking to partner with the 
U.S. on matters of security.113 
 
Mr. Shapiro argues the United States can gain influence by assisting its allies and 
partners through Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military Finances, which would 
enable them to operationally partner with one another. By operating from the same 
weapons platforms, they would have the ability to cooperate, as the defense systems 
would be able to communicate with one another. Also, the United States would have to 
train our partners on the systems, thus creating more opportunities to deepen partnerships.  
Professional Military Education is another program, Mr. Shapiro sees as an opportunity 
to further ties by exchanging military officers for professional education. Military 
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education exchanges help the U.S. and its partners to improve their language ability, gain 
an appreciation for one another’s cultures, and develop professional relationships with 
one another that can be used as the officer’s advance in rank and responsibility.114 For 
further details on defense diplomacy tools, please refer to Chapter 1’s Table 1. 
 
Goran Swistek is another proponent of security diplomacy, and argues that there is a 
relation between modern foreign affairs and security policy. He views security diplomacy 
as an instrument of international realpolitik that seeks to preserve the balance of power by 
supporting partners and thwarting enemies from gaining the advantage. Mr. Swistek 
believes it’s used today to build and maintain partnerships with former opponents as well 
as newly engaged partners. Furthermore, it has become one of the first diplomatic tools 
used in post-conflict zones to consolidate the absence of fundamental violence. Also, it 
has the legitimate function of facilitating cooperation, in the sensitive areas of security, 
between partner states. By using security diplomacy as a diplomatic instrument, one 
hopes to shape the environment, and create a partnership founded on stability and 
security.115 
 
In reaction to Russian actions in Eastern Europe, leadership within the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization is using security diplomacy to reassure its member states, in close 
proximity to Russia, of their intent to support. To assuage fears of abandonment, NATO 
has implemented multiple measures designed to reinforce its eastern flank, from Russia, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Ibid, pg. 26-29 
115 Swistek, Göran. 2012. "The Nexus Between Public Diplomacy and Military Diplomacy in Foreign 
Affairs and Defense Policy." Connections (18121098) 11, no. 2: 79-86. International Security & Counter 
Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost (accessed April 1, 2015). 
	   60	  
through the creation of a 4,000 – 6,000 strong rapid response task force, the streamlining 
of the command, command and control infrastructure, and conducting a series of 
rotational force deployments into Central and Eastern Europe.116  
 
Samantha Power, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations as well as Harry Kissinger, 
recently expressed concern about the U.S. using security diplomacy to escalate the 
violence in Eastern Europe. Mr. Kissinger argues that the United States should refrain 
from using security diplomacy, and seek another means to help the Ukrainian people 
work with the Russians to solve their differences. He goes on to say that the U.S. and 
Europe are partially responsible for the violence due to underestimating the “special 
significance” of Ukraine for the Russian government.117  
 
In concurrence with Mr. Kissinger, Professor Cohen, out of Princeton University and 
New York University, argues that the European Union’s attempt to bring Ukraine into an 
exclusive arrangement with the E.U. would serve as a catalyst to internal historical 
divisions within Ukraine, and provoke a Russian response.118 “In fact, as University of 
Chicago professor John J. Mearsheimer concludes in Foreign Affairs, “the United States 
and its European allies share most of the responsibility for the crisis.” In the face of 
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Russian warnings and despite agreements to the contrary, over the past two decades the 
United States has expanded NATO to Russia’s border.”119 
 
Both proponents and opponents for the use of security diplomacy in Eastern Europe agree 
that it has been successful in helping the United States and its allies in 
gaining/maintaining greater influence throughout Eastern Europe; however, I agree that 
the United States should consider the second and third order effects of encroaching on 
what Russia views as its natural spheres of influence. I’m not arguing against it, but 
thorough cost – benefit analysis as well as risk management should be done prior to 
moving forward with any country that borders Russia. That way, should a conflict erupt, 
the United States can have a plan in place to deal with the fallout.  
 
Research Methodology 
Chapter 3 follows the same qualitative approach as its two predecessors. In this chapter, I 
will attempt to demonstrate that the United States can use security diplomacy to improve 
its diplomatic relationships with Eastern European countries. Specifically, I will examine 
the European Combatant Command’s relationship with Eastern Europe, and whether it 
adds value to the United States overall diplomatic mission. Furthermore, I will look at the 
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HYPOTHESIS 
My hypothesis is the United States can increase its credibility and influence in Eastern 
Europe through the use of security diplomacy. Security diplomacy alone, or in 
synchronization with other diplomatic tools, can build trust the United States Eastern 
European nations. More so, the U.S. can assist its partners in creating a stable and secure 
environment that promotes democratic ideas. 
 
HISTORY OF U.S. AND EASTERN EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 
 
In the past, U.S. diplomatic policies towards Eastern Europe were heavily driven by its 
adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union. Although the United States initially 
greeted the Russian Revolution with excitement, it quickly reversed its stance as the 
Bolsheviks came to power in 1917. In fact, the United States was the last country to 
recognize and grant full diplomatic relations to the Soviet Union in 1933. This 
relationship would continue to be poor until the Soviet Union entered World War II in 
support of the Allies. During this period, the U.S. and Soviet relationship hit a high point 
that would not be replicated until the end of the Cold War.120  
 
Diplomatic relations with Eastern Europe, specifically Warsaw Pact members, following 
World War II were defined by the Cold War. During this period the United States sought 
to contain the spread of communism, and was in a constant struggle with the Soviet 
Union economically, militarily, and socially. From the Cold War came events like the 
Space Race, the Vietnam War, the Truman Doctrine, and President Reagan’s Star Wars 
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program. This competition would continue to define U.S. diplomacy until the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1991.   
 
Following the Cold War, the world witnessed the expansion of NATO into Central and 
Eastern Europe with former Warsaw Pact countries becoming members. Nation-states 
like Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic States transitioned to democracies as well 
as became members of the European Union. However, as the European Union and NATO 
increased its power base within the region, Russia experienced the opposite with its 
influence declining at the behest of its Cold War rivals. While business was good for the 
United States and NATO, Russia experienced a humiliating decline until the end of the 
twentieth century when it began to reassert itself on the international stage as the 
protector of all Russian people. And slowly Russia has started, beginning with Georgia in 
2008, to reassert its regional power in its perceived area of interest(s).121  
 
 
U.S. USE OF SECURITY DIPLOMACY IN EASTERN EUROPE 
Following the end of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe experienced widespread interest 
in democratic ideas as former Warsaw Pact countries transitioned from communist to 
democratically elected governments.  As a result, the United States and these new 
countries began developing relationships based on common defense, rule-of-law, human 
rights, energy security, and the economy.122   
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One of the key diplomatic instruments, used by the U.S., to breakdown historic barriers 
from the Cold War was security diplomacy. Security diplomacy helped to increase 
cooperation, build trust, and lay the foundation for improving diplomacy with partners. It 
was able to achieve this on a number of levels: 
• Used as a gesture, by the U.S. government, to demonstrate the willingness to 
pursue greater cooperation, build mutual trust, and the desire to move beyond 
disputes.  
 
• Used as an instrument for introducing transparency into a relationship.  
• Used to shape and reinforce perceptions of mutual interest within a partner or 
potential partners government.  
 
• Used to support partner states security reforms  
• Used as a tool to encourage greater cooperation in other areas of government.123 
 
In the following case studies, I will discuss post Cold War security diplomacy in Eastern 




United States European Command (EUCOM) 
When looking at U.S. bi-lateral security diplomacy in Europe, one must immediately 
begin with the United States European Command. EUCOM is a Geographical Combatant 
Command that’s based in Stuttgart, Germany. Its area of responsibility covers one – fifth 
of the world, and includes all of Europe; large swathes of Asia; sections of north Africa; 
the Artic; and Israel. Part of EUCOM’s mission includes managing bi-lateral military 
relations with 51 countries and NATO; in addition, it must work with other Combatant 
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Commands and inter-agencies partners to ensure U.S. security policy is conducted 
effectively and efficiently.124   
 
Due to overall reductions in the DoD’s budget, EUCOM has had to reduce its overall 
footprint in Europe. At the height of the Cold War the United States had more than 
450,000 troops stationed in Europe, but today there are fewer than 65,000 permanent 
military personnel with only 55,000 in direct support of the EUCOM mission.125 
 
These personnel are tasked with conducting the same deterrent and reassurance missions 
of past decades, to include, the Cold War; however, they also provide a number of other 
undertakings too. This includes assuring Allies and partners of the U.S. governments 
commitment to the collective defense; training and collaborating on interoperability; 
working with allies and partners on preparing to effectively respond to humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief operations; and working with interagency partners in a 
whole of government approach to countering illicit trafficking.126  A great example of 
these undertakings coming together is EUCOM’s Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR).  
 
In response to Russian hostility, EUCOM executed OAR, which utilizes U.S. access and 
strategic reach to reassure U.S. Allies and partners, and deter further Russian aggression 
in Eastern Europe. According to the EUCOM Commander, the cornerstone of this 
strategy is EUCOM’s physical presence supported by the visible commitment to allies. 
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This includes maintaining security capabilities, readiness and responsiveness, and the 
commitment to sovereignty and security of its partners.127  
 
Following several months of military training in Poland, one recent show of force by the 
United States was a 1,100 mile military convoy, through six countries, beginning in 
Estonia and ending in Germany. This exercise demonstrates the maneuverability of the 
U.S. Army to respond to rapidly developing situations, and served as a messaging 
mechanism to the Russians government that the U.S. is committed to its Allies and 
partners.128  
 
In addition, the U.S. promised its European partners support through the European 
Reassurance Initiative. This program is part of the 2015 National Defense Authorization 
Act, and will provide $1 billion in funding that will seek to strengthen the U.S. and 
NATO position against the backdrop of destabilizing Russian policies. This money will 
ensure that OAR can continue unhampered as well as build further security capacity with 
countries outside of NATO like Georgia, Moldova, and the Ukraine. Ultimately, the 
European Reassurance Initiative grants EUCOM the financial freedom to increase the 
readiness, responsiveness, and interoperability of its military forces in Europe, but also its 
NATO allies and partners.129 
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I propose that EUCOM’s importance is directly tied to the Russian threat in Eastern 
Europe. Should Russia continue to destabilize the region with aggressive military 
policies, the U.S. government will increase its use of security diplomacy in direct 
proportion to the threat.  And EUCOM will be the tip of the spear for implementing U.S. 
security diplomacy with its Allies and partners. 
 
 
Poland Case Study 
The United States and Poland have maintained relations since it’s founding in 1919. 
Although relations were not ideal during the Cold War, the two countries maintained 
some dialogue until the fall of the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, the bi-lateral 
relationship between the countries drastically improved.  Now Poland is considered a key 
ally of the United States, and one of its strongest partners, on the continent, in fostering 
transatlantic security, prosperity, and in promoting democracy in Eastern Europe.130   
 
U.S. economic and security assistance to Poland assisted the country in transitioning to a 
democracy, and in 2000 it graduated from USAID assistance, and went on to become a 
provider of assistance to other countries in the region. In addition, U.S. security 
assistance has enabled Poland to meet its NATO obligations, and to deploy and sustain 
professional forces in multilateral operations. Poland was a Coalition member during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, and is a key Coalition member in Afghanistan.131  
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In fact, U.S. security diplomacy has been so effective in building interoperability between 
the two countries that a General Officer within the Polish military served as the Deputy 
Commander to the Special Operations Joint Task Force – Afghanistan.  This two star 
headquarters was responsible for all special operations activities occurring in Afghanistan 
from 2012 to present. In addition, many Polish Officers held key Staff Officer positions, 
and assisted in the plans and operations of the command. This clearly demonstrates the 
trust that has been built between the two countries, and the ability to operate successfully 
together in a hostile environment. 132 
 
A large part of this success is owed to the investment the U.S. has put into its relationship 
with Poland. Over five fiscal years, the Polish government has received $220 million in 
Foreign Military Financing support, which has assisted the Polish military in modernizing 
its equipment and training its forces. Furthermore, the Polish government has received 
over $2 million for International Military Education and Training. This training has 
allowed for Poland’s most senior military officers to attend U.S. senior-level defense 
courses at U.S. institutions, of which, they have distinguished themselves by taking up 
almost one third of the U.S. National Defense University’s “Wall of Honor” photos. All 
of which has greatly improved Poland’s security institutions.133  
 
To tie in other aspects of security diplomacy, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
collaborates with the Polish national Police Force and other law enforcement entities on 
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cases related to terrorism, money laundering, organized crime, and other criminal 
activities.134 Furthermore the Drug Enforcement Agency works with the Polish 
authorities on international drug related criminal activity to include money laundering.135 
According to Polish Radio, the DEA will be assisting Poland’s law enforcement in 
tackling drug trafficking rings and channels within Poland.136 Additionally, Polish law 
enforcement officers have attended DEA’s El Paso training center as well as received 
over $80,000 worth of night – vision gear, drug testing kits, and search equipment.137 
 
There can be no disputing that security diplomacy has played a huge role in assisting the 
United States in breaking down historic barriers from the Cold War. Through security 
cooperation, the U.S. has built closer ties with the Polish government, and as a result 
Poland as well as its neighbors are more stable and secure. Security diplomacy has 
allowed for professional relationships to foster, and both countries are better prepared to 
face future challenges together.  
 
 
Ukraine Case Study 
Prior to the Ukrainian conflict, the United States assistance programs focused on the 
development of a prosperous and secure Ukraine that was based on democratic ideas. 
This included promoting the development of sustainable institutions and processes that 
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advanced democracy, human rights, rule-of-law, and increase the militaries ability to 
operate with western forces.138  
 
From a security diplomacy perspective during this time period, the United States 
provided military training to Ukrainian non-commissioned officers in western tactics and 
the English language; in addition, the U.S. provided new specialized equipment or 
upgrades to existing equipment in order to improve interoperability between the west and 
Ukraine. Furthermore, the U.S. provided technical assistance to Ukrainian law 
enforcement agencies on professionalism and human rights. Other training included 
techniques on combating cyber crime, human and drug trafficking, and other 
international criminal threats. Table 2 provides a good example of the emphasis put on 
security diplomacy, during this time period, compared to other facets of diplomacy.139 
 
Table 3: U.S. Assistance Activities for Ukraine by Objective.140 
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Total (in thousand $)  103,593 102,576 95,271 
Peace and Security  36,562 34,346 30,940 
Governing Justly and 
Democratically  28,492 24,558 22,713 
Investing in People  17,823 29,587 28,704 
Economic Growth  19,419 12,885 11,914 
Humanitarian 
Assistance  1,297 1,200 1,000 
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Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea and their support to Russian separatists in eastern 
Ukraine, the United States and NATO have scrambled to determine the extent of the 
threat, and to deter further aggressive actions by Russia. Although Ukraine is not a 
NATO member, the United States and its European partners recognize the short – mid – 
long-term ramifications from this crisis, if left unchecked.  
 
In response, the United States has ramped up its security diplomacy efforts to reinforce 
its commitment to the Ukrainian government as well as shape future Russian behavior.  
This includes a Department of State initiative that seeks to reform Ukraine’s police force 
and train its newly formed National Guard. The goal of this program is to strengthening 
its current law enforcement capabilities in order to promote rule-of-law throughout the 
country, and to stand-up a tactical headquarters unit along with four maneuver companies 
to assist in Ukraine’s internal defense.141 
 
In a show of support, the U.S. will provide an additional $46 million in security 
assistance funds. This money will be used to support the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the 
State Border Guard. Specifically, it will include light – medium – and heavy military 
equipment such as night vision goggles, trucks, radar systems, and body armor. Also, 
EUCOM, along with other experts, have begun an initiative to improve Ukraine’s 
capacity to provide for its own defense, and improve its ability for long-term security 
cooperation with the U.S. and its partners. An example of this initiative was the recent 
deployment of medical and security assistance advisory teams that sought to improve 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 2015. “Operation Atlantic Resolve Fact Sheet.” Communication and Engagement Directorate, U.S. 
European Command. (Accessed March 31, 2015). 
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Ukraine’s ability to perform combat medical care as well as identify other areas in need 
of security assistance.142 
 
 
Another major security diplomacy program underway is DoD experts in strategy and 
policy meeting with their Ukrainian peers to identify specific defense building programs 
the U.S. may want to pursue in an effort to reform existing programs that might not be 
conducive to a long-term/sustained program for future U.S. efforts to support the 
Ukrainian military through subject matter experts and long – term advisors.143   
 
All of the above efforts are further examples of the United States utilizing security 
diplomacy as a means to further U.S. influence in Eastern Europe, while building long-






In 2014, the world witnessed a rise in Russian aggression as it sought to reassert itself in 
what it considers its natural spheres of influence. In response, the United States 
implement an effective strategy that utilized security diplomacy, along with other forms, 
as a means to counter Russian aggression without resorting to kinetic military action. By 
providing monetary assistance, military equipment, joint training, and through the show-
of-force exercises the United States reinforced its commitment to its Eastern European 
Allies and partners. Through these actions, the U.S. dispelled any doubts in their 
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partner’s minds on the commitment it has towards its allies and partners. I argue that 
through security diplomacy, during a crisis such as this, the United States has been able 
to increase its influence throughout the region, and reassure other nation-states of its 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The study of security diplomacy as it relates to today’s international system is critical for 
scholars, military leaders, diplomats, and policymakers alike. They must possess a true 
understanding of what security diplomacy entails, and how it can be implemented as a 
diplomatic tool. Just as important, wielders of security diplomacy must comprehend the 
multitude of options under security diplomacy, and recognize that it’s not a solution for 
every problem. Multiple pitfalls can develop from a poor strategy, which might result in 
negative second and third order effects that reverberate globally.  
 
As discussed throughout this thesis, history must always be kept in mind when 
developing a strategy that employs security diplomacy as a tool to gain influence in a 
country or region. In this thesis, I demonstrated how it could effectively be used alone or 
in coordination with other forms of diplomacy in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and 
Eastern Europe.  
 
In Chapter 1, I illustrated the evolution of defense diplomacy over the centuries, and 
propose that today’s global environment demanded more than the Defense Attachés of 
yesterday. Instead, I recommend the U.S. government take a whole of government 
approach to security, known as security diplomacy that includes defense, law 
enforcement, and humanitarian assistance. When tailored to its customers in Latin 
America, security diplomacy has proven to be successful in attaining U.S. policy 
objectives. This was seen from the success the United States had with breaking down 
historical barriers in Columbia as well as Mexico. Although Plan Columbia and the 
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Merida Initiative were different, they both aided the governments in dealing with internal 
unrest/violence, and helped create long-term relationships based on mutual interest.  
 
In Chapter 2, I transitioned to Africa, and examined the effectiveness of the United States 
security diplomacy efforts with partner nations, and whether they were helping the U.S. 
gain influence in the region. From my case studies, I concluded that the U.S. has proven 
to be a reliable partner, economic and security, and assisted in creating a stable 
environment that respects sovereignty, rule of law, and a strong military. This can be seen 
by the economic and security aid that Kenya receives as well as the U.S. response to the 
Ebola outbreak in West Africa. In addition, the U.S. not placing its Combatant Command 
headquarters on the African continent demonstrated a respect for the African nation’s 
past.  
 
In my last chapter, I looked at U.S. security diplomacy in Eastern Europe following the 
fall of the Soviet Union, and sought to identify whether historic rivalries would prevent it 
from being effective. I discovered that security diplomacy was very effective tool in 
building bi-lateral relationships with former Warsaw Pact nations, as they sought to find a 
counterweight to Russian dominance. However, I came to the conclusion that the 
constant expansion of the NATO and European Union upset the regional balance by 
crossing one of Russia’s redlines. As a response to their fear of constant incursions into 
their areas of interest, the Russian government responded with force in George and the 
Ukraine. While I do not fault the United States or European Union, I do believe that the 
two organizations fell into one of the pitfalls of not recognizing the second and third 
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order effects from not respecting another nation or region’s history. Had they done so, 
they might have approached Ukraine differently.  
 
In conclusion, I believe the United States can use security diplomacy as a means or way 
to gain influence with current or potential allies/partners; however, planners must avoid 
pitfalls, like ignoring historical factors, when developing their strategic plans. I fully 
acknowledge that my findings are not universal, but I argue my case studies are 
conclusive enough to consider security diplomacy as a very effective means to achieve 
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